


Boolean modelling of biological processes

Samuel Pastva

`samuel.pastva@ist.ac.at`


The sequencing boom

- Modern single-cell sequencing enables observations orders of magnitude more precise than 10-20 years ago.
- Activity of thousands of genes across thousands of cells, tissues and mutations.
- How do we rigorously use this data to understand complex biological systems?




Mechanistic modelling

- Mechanistic models:
 - Grounded in explainable biochemical principles.
- “Black box” model learns to answer questions.
- “Mechanistic” model helps to design new questions.
- Boolean networks:
 - Simple, massively parallel programs emulating gene regulation.




Where are we going?

- Synthesis/inference:
 - What models fit observed data?
 - Bonus round: what does it even mean to fit data?
- Selection/identifiability:
 - Which candidate model is the "best"?
 - How to design experiments to improve the candidate set?
 - Can we learn something from an incomplete model?
- BDDs / ASP / SMT / SAT
- As always... scalability...



Formal Methods for Safe and Trustworthy Probabilistic Systems

Djordje Zikelic




Formal verification

Formal controller synthesis

Applications

Formal verification

```
 $x = 0$   
while  $x \geq 0$  do  
   $r_1 := \text{Uniform}([-1, 0.5])$   
   $x := x + r_1$   
  if  $x \geq 100$  then  
     $r_2 := \text{Uniform}([-1, 2])$   
     $x := x + r_2$ 
```



Probabilistic programs


Randomized algorithms

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
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
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Neurosymbolic methods




Distributional properties

Applications

Formal verification


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
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
Bidding games
on graphs



Blockchain protocols
(very recent)

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
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
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
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Why neurosymbolic methods, why formal?



Safety-critical applications require formal correctness guarantees

Learner-verifier framework [1,2,3]




[1] Chang, Roohi, Gao. *Neural Lyapunov Control*. NeurIPS 2019

[2] Ravanbakhsh, Sankaranarayanan. *Learning Control Lyapunov Functions from Counterexamples and Demonstrations*. Autonomous Robots 2019

[3] Abate, Ahmed, Giacobbe, Peruffo. *Formal Synthesis of Lyapunov Neural Networks*. IEEE Control Systems Letters 2020

Learner-verifier framework




What are learnable certificates for stochastic systems?

How to learn these certificates?

How to formally verify these certificates?

Learner-verifier framework



Results*


Neural martingales as formal certificates

Learner-verifier loop for neural policies + martingales

(reachability [AAAI'22], reach-avoidance [AAAI'23], stability [ATVA'23], compositional reasoning [NeurIPS'23], Bayesian neural networks [NeurIPS'21])

*Joint work with Mathias Lechner, Krish, Tom, Matin Ansaripour, Abhinav Verma

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What's next?

Richer specifications

Compositional reasoning about systems, neural policies and neural certificates

Scaling to larger systems

*Joint work with Mathias Lechner, Krish, Tom, Matin Ansaripour, Abhinav Verma

Custom Theory Reasoning

Clemens Eisenhofer

TU Wien, Austria



SPyCoDe

SMT solvers

Satisfiability Modulo Theories (*SMT*) solvers support reasoning in (fragments of) first-order logic:

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- ▶ SMT-solvers can reason natively in a wide range of theories: Integers, arrays, strings, bit-vectors, ADTs, . . .
- ⇒ Essential component in automated software/hardware/protocol verification.

SMT solvers

Satisfiability Modulo Theories (*SMT*) solvers support reasoning in (fragments of) first-order logic:

```
int32 i1 , i2 ;  
...  
assume(i1 > 0);  
arr[0] = 1;  
arr[i1 + i2] = 2;  
assert(arr[0] = 1);
```

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```
int32 i1 , i2;           ...  $\wedge$   
...                      $i1 > 0 \wedge$   
assume(i1 > 0);         $\Rightarrow arr_1 = store(arr_0, 0, 1) \wedge$   
arr[0] = 1;             $arr_2 = store(arr_1, i1 + i2, 2) \wedge$   
arr[i1 + i2] = 2;      $select(arr_2, 0) \neq 1$   
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<code>int32 i1, i2;</code>	<code>... ^</code>	
<code>...</code>	<code>i1 > 0 ^</code>	<code>array₀ ↦ ⟨0, ..., 0⟩,</code>
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<code>arr[i1 + i2] = 2;</code>	<code>select(arr₂, 0) ≠ 1</code>	<code>i1 ↦ 2³¹,</code>
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The solver has efficient procedures for dealing with `>`, `+`, `select`, and `store`.

My Current Research

- ▶ Custom theory reasoning (“user-propagation”) in Z3


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fixed(ast, value) :

```
queenY = queenToY(ast)  
queenX = value
```

```
if (queenX ≥ board)  
  conflict({ ast })  
  return
```

```
foreach (fixed in alreadyFixedVars)  
  otherX = model[fixed]  
  otherY = queenToY(fixed)
```

```
if (|queenX - otherX| = |queenY - otherY|)  
  conflict({ ast, fixed })  
else if (queenX = otherX)  
  conflict({ ast, fixed })
```

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 - ▶ *New (Nielson) string solver as theory extension*
 - ▶ “a” ++ x = x ++ “b”

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Applying SMT Propagation to
“Everything”



Der Wissenschaftsfonds.



Interface Theory for Security and Privacy

Ana Oliveira da Costa

Institute of Science and Technology Austria (ISTA)

October 9, 2023

Designing Secure Systems

We need to consider:

- Multiple architectural layers.
- Sub-systems developed by different teams.
- Heterogeneous components.
- Interaction between cyber and physical components.

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Contract-based design.

Interface Theory

Luca de Alfaro and Thomas A. Henzinger. *Interface theories for component-based design*. (2001)


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


Interface Theory


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Refinement (\preceq)




Interface Theory

Incremental Design: Composition only requires knowledge about the parts being composed.

Interface Theory


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If $F \sim G$ and $F \otimes G \sim H$, then $G \sim H$ and $F \sim G \otimes H$.




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Independent Implementability: Independent refinement of subsystems.



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Independent Implementability: Independent refinement of subsystems.

If $F \sim G$ and $F' \preceq F$, then $F' \sim G$ and $F' \otimes G \preceq F \otimes G$.

Information-flow Interfaces

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Information-flow interfaces. (2022)

Security policies abstracted as information-flow constraints.


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
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
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
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- no-flow requirements on the closed-system as *closed-guarantees*.



What is next?

- Explore formalisms to specify *what is* an information flow.
- Dive into real-world use cases.
- Explore the limits of interface theory for the design of secure systems.

Finding counterexamples to $\forall\exists$ -safety hyperproperties

...and other forays into incorrectness

Tobias Nießen

TU Wien

October 9, 2023

$\forall\exists$ -safety hyperproperties

Definition (informal, intuition)

“For each trace τ there exists a trace τ' such that τ and τ' do not interact badly.”

$\forall\exists$ -safety hyperproperties

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Example (Refinement)

$$\forall^P \tau \exists^Q \tau' (in_\tau = in_{\tau'} \wedge out_\tau = out_{\tau'})$$

$\forall\exists$ -safety hyperproperties

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Example (Refinement)

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Hint: $\underbrace{y := x * \text{random}(\mathbb{N})}_P$ refines $\underbrace{y := x * \text{random}(\mathbb{Z})}_Q$, but not vice versa

Verification of $\forall\exists$ hyperproperties – unsurprisingly difficult

Undecidability of trace properties

+ quantification over multiple traces

+ quantifier alternation

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Undecidability of trace properties

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	Loops	Infinite states	Complete	Counterexamples
Strategy-based approaches	✓	✓	✗	✗
Automata-based approaches	✓	✗	✓	✗
Relational Hoare-style logic	✗	✓	✓	✓

$\forall\exists$ -safety hyperproperties – our approach to finding counterexamples

Goal: find model for negation of $\forall\exists$ -safety property

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Combine **underapproximate methods** to find counterexamples

- **symbolic execution** for universally quantified traces
- **bounded model checking** for existentially quantified traces
- lift both algorithms to an **SMT solver** for infinite variable domains
- typically requires many iterations to **exclude spurious refutations**

$\forall\exists$ -safety hyperproperties – our approach to finding counterexamples

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Does this terminate? Sometimes. Maybe. It depends...

Runtime Monitoring Neural Certificates

Emily Yu

Klosterneuburg, Austria
October 9, 2023



Dynamical Systems

$$f : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{U} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$$



[forbes.com]

Learning Certificate Functions


Requirements

- ◇ Stability: Lyapunov function $V : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$
 - certifies stability around a fixed point
- ◇ Safety: Barrier function $h : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$
 - certifies invariance of a region

Verifying Certificates faces challenges







- ◇ Generalization error bounds: [Liu+'20, Boffi+'21, ChangGao'21]
- ◇ Lipschitz arguments : [Richards+'18, BobitiLazar'18]
- ◇ Learner-verifier: [Chang+'19, Peruffo+'21, Chatterjee+'23] etc

Monitoring Certificate Functions






- Validating certificate at runtime

References I

-  Chang, Ya-Chien, and Sicun Gao. "Stabilizing neural control using self-learned almost lyapunov critics." 2021 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA). IEEE, 2021.
-  Boffi, Nicholas, et al. "Learning stability certificates from data." Conference on Robot Learning. PMLR, 2021.
-  Liu, Shenyu, Daniel Liberzon, and Vadim Zharnitsky. "Almost Lyapunov functions for nonlinear systems." Automatica 113 (2020): 108758.
-  Richards, Spencer M., Felix Berkenkamp, and Andreas Krause. "The lyapunov neural network: Adaptive stability certification for safe learning of dynamical systems." Conference on Robot Learning. PMLR, 2018.
-  Bobiti, Ruxandra, and Mircea Lazar. "Automated-sampling-based stability verification and DOA estimation for nonlinear systems." IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 63.11 (2018): 3659-3674.
-  Chatterjee, Krishnendu, et al. "A Learner-Verifier Framework for Neural Network Controllers and Certificates of Stochastic Systems." International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023.

References II

-  Chang, Ya-Chien, Nima Roohi, and Sicun Gao. "Neural lyapunov control." Advances in neural information processing systems 32 (2019).
-  Peruffo, Andrea, Daniele Ahmed, and Alessandro Abate. "Automated and formal synthesis of neural barrier certificates for dynamical models." International conference on tools and algorithms for the construction and analysis of systems. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021.
-  <https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2022/07/27/ai-from-drug-discovery-to-robotics/?sh=37eef0c53d7f>

Credits

Diagrams have been designed using images from [Flaticon.com](https://www.flaticon.com/).

2023 – KLOSTERNEUBURG AUSTRIA

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Quantitative Safety and Liveness of Quantitative Automata

Boolean Properties

Definition

A Boolean property $\Phi \subseteq \Sigma^\omega$ or equivalently $\Phi: \Sigma^\omega \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, is a language

Safety

Requests Not Duplicated

Liveness

All Requests Granted

Boolean Properties

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A Boolean property $\Phi \subseteq \Sigma^\omega$ or equivalently $\Phi: \Sigma^\omega \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, is a language

Safety

Requests Not Duplicated

Liveness

All Requests Granted

Theorem: Decomposition of Boolean properties¹

All property Φ can be expressed by:

- ▶ Φ_{safe} is safe
- ▶ Φ_{live} is live

$$\Phi = \Phi_{safe} \cap \Phi_{live}$$

¹ Alpern, Schneider. *Defining liveness*. 1985

Boolean Properties

Definition

A Boolean property $\Phi \subseteq \Sigma^\omega$ or equivalently $\Phi: \Sigma^\omega \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, is a language

Safety

Requests Not Duplicated

Safety closure

smaller enlargement
to get a safe language

Liveness

All Requests Granted

Theorem: Decomposition of Boolean properties¹

All property Φ can be expressed by:

- ▶ Φ_{safe} is safe
- ▶ Φ_{live} is live

$$\Phi = \Phi_{safe} \cap \Phi_{live}$$

¹ Alpern, Schneider. *Defining liveness*. 1985

Quantitative Properties

Definition²

A quantitative property $\Phi: \Sigma^\omega \rightarrow \mathbb{D}$ is a quantitative language where \mathbb{D} is a complete lattice

Safety

Minimal Response Time

Liveness

Average Response Time

² Chatterjee, Doyen, Henzinger. *Quantitative Languages*. 2010

Quantitative Properties

Definition

A quantitative property $\Phi: \Sigma^\omega \rightarrow \mathbb{D}$ is a quantitative language where \mathbb{D} is a complete lattice

Safety

Minimal Response Time

Safety closure

the least safety property that bounds the original from above

Liveness

Average Response Time


Theorem: Decomposition of quantitative properties³

All property Φ can be expressed by: $\Phi(w) = \min\{\Phi_{\text{safe}}(w), \Phi_{\text{live}}(w)\}$ for all $w \in \Sigma^\omega$

- ▶ Φ_{safe} is safe
- ▶ Φ_{live} is live

³ Henzinger, Mazzocchi, Saraç. *Quantitative Safety and Liveness*. 2023

Quantitative Automata




Word: $w = a_1 a_2 \dots$ Run value: $x = f(x_1 x_2 \dots)$

Value functions

Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup

LimInfAvg, LimSupAvg, DSum

Quantitative Automata




Word: $w = a_1 a_2 \dots$ Run value: $x = f(x_1 x_2 \dots)$

Value functions

Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup


LimInfAvg, LimSupAvg, DSum

Non-determinism



$\mathcal{A}(w) = \sup\{\text{values of } w\text{'s runs}\}$

Quantitative Automata



Word: $w = a_1 a_2 \dots$ Run value: $x = f(x_1 x_2 \dots)$


Theorem⁴

The set $\{w \in \Sigma^\omega \mid \mathcal{A}(w) = \top\}$ is dense if and only if the automaton \mathcal{A} is live

Value functions

Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup
LimInfAvg, LimSupAvg, DSum


Non-determinism



$\mathcal{A}(w) = \sup\{\text{values of } w\text{'s runs}\}$

⁴ Boker, Henzinger, Mazzocchi, Saraç. *Safety and Liveness of Quantitative Automata*. 2023

Quantitative Automata



Word: $w = a_1 a_2 \dots$ Run value: $x = f(x_1 x_2 \dots)$

Value functions

Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup
LimInfAvg, LimSupAvg, DSum


Theorem⁴

The set $\{w \in \Sigma^\omega \mid \mathcal{A}(w) = \top\}$ is dense if and only if the automaton \mathcal{A} is live

Theorem⁴

An automaton is live if and only if its safety closure is the constant \top

Non-determinism



$\mathcal{A}(w) = \sup\{\text{values of } w\text{'s runs}\}$

⁴ Boker, Henzinger, Mazzocchi, Saraç. *Safety and Liveness of Quantitative Automata*. 2023

Take away message

	Inf	Sup, LimInf, LimSup	LimInfAvg, LimSupAvg	DSum
Is it safe? i.e., $\mathcal{A}^* = \mathcal{A}$	$O(1)$	PSPACE-complete	EXPSPACE PSPACE-hard	$O(1)$
Is it live? i.e., $\mathcal{A}^* = \top$	PSPACE-complete			
Decomposition $\mathcal{A} = \min \mathcal{A}_{\text{safe}} \mathcal{A}_{\text{live}}$	$O(1)$	P _{TIME} if deterministic	Open	$O(1)$

\mathcal{A}^* is the Safety closure of \mathcal{A}

Take away message

	Inf	Sup, LimInf, LimSup	LimInfAvg, LimSupAvg	DSum
Is it safe? i.e., $\mathcal{A}^* = \mathcal{A}$	$O(1)$	PSPACE-complete	EXPSPACE PSPACE-hard	$O(1)$
Is it live? i.e., $\mathcal{A}^* = \top$	PSPACE-complete			
Decomposition $\mathcal{A} = \min \mathcal{A}_{\text{safe}} \mathcal{A}_{\text{live}}$	$O(1)$	P _{TIME} if deterministic	Open	$O(1)$

\mathcal{A}^* is the Safety closure of \mathcal{A}

1

T. A. Henzinger, N. Mazzocchi and
N. E. Saraç

Quantitative Safety and Liveness

In *FOSSACS* proceedings 2023

2

U. Boker, T. A. Henzinger, N. Mazzocchi
and N. E. Saraç

Safety and Liveness of Quantitative Automata

In *CONCUR* proceedings 2023

Thank you

Solving Parity

and Rubik Games

K. S. Thejaswini

Laure Daviaud
Rupak Majumdar

Marcin Jurdziński
Rémi Morvan


Pierre Ohlmann
Imak Sağlam

Solving Parity and Rubik Games

K. S. Thejaswini

Henzinger
Group


Parity Games



STEVEN 

AUDREY 


Parity Games



STEVEN 

AUDREY 


Parity Games



STEVEN 

AUDREY 


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STEVEN 

AUDREY 


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

STEVEN 

AUDREY 


Parity Games



Play
2,2

STEVEN 
AUDREY 

Parity Games




Play
2, 2, 3

STEVEN □

AUDREY △

Parity Games




Play
2, 2, 3, 2

STEVEN 

AUDREY 

Parity Games




Play
2, 2, 3, 2, 2

STEVEN 

AUDREY 

Parity Games




Play
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2

STEVEN 

AUDREY 

Parity Games




Play

2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2
... 2, 2, ...

STEVEN 

AUDREY 

Parity Games



Winner :
parity of limsup


2, 2, 3, 2, 2, 2
... 2, 2, ...

- Steven Wins

STEVEN

AUDREY

Parity Games



Winner :
parity of limsup

$2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2$
 $\dots 2, 2, \dots$


- Steven Wins

$2, 2, 3, 2, 2, 3, 2,$
 $\dots, 2, 3, 2, \dots$

STEVEN \square

AUDREY \triangle

Parity Games



Winner :
parity of limsup

2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2
... 2, 2, ...

- Steven Wins


2, 2, 3, 2, 2, 3, 2,
... , 2, 3, 2, ...

- Audrey Wins

STEVEN 

AUDREY 

Parity Games




Steven
Dominion

Audrey
Dominion

STEVEN 

AUDREY 

Rabin Games




STEVEN 

AUDREY 

Rabin Games

{😊 😞 😇}




STEVEN □

AUDREY △

Rabin Games


{😊 😞 😇}




STEVEN □

AUDREY △


Rabin Games




STEVEN



AUDREY




Rabin Games



STEVEN




AUDREY




Rabin Games


{😊 😞 😇}



STEVEN




AUDREY




Rabin Games


{😊 😞 😊}




STEVEN



AUDREY



Rabin Games




STEVEN



AUDREY



Rabin Games



STEVEN




AUDREY




Rabin Games

{😊 😞 😊}



STEVEN




AUDREY




Accepting

Rabin Games


{😊 😞 😇}



STEVEN




AUDREY




Rabin Games


{😊 😞 😟}



STEVEN




AUDREY



Rabin Games


{😊 😞 😇}




STEVEN



AUDREY



Rabin Games



STEVEN




AUDREY



Rabin Games

{😊 😞 😊}



STEVEN



AUDREY



Does Steven win from a given vertex?

Parity Games

UP \cap co-UP


Quasi-polynomial time
 $O(n^{\log(d)+o(1)})$

Rabin Games


NP-complete

Does Steven win from a given vertex?


Parity Games



Rabin Games




(n, h) Universal Tree



$(4, 2)$ -Universal

There are small (n, h) -universal trees : $O(n^{\log h})$


(n, h, s) -Strahler Universal Tree



$(4, 2, 2)$ -Strahler Universal Tree

There are (n, h, s) -Strahler Universal Trees of size $O\left(\left(\frac{h}{s}\right)^2 \cdot \text{poly}(n)\right)$

Colourful Universal Trees




$\{\bullet, \bullet, \bullet\}$ - colourful - Δ - universal

There are C -colourful trees of size $(|C|!)^{1+\epsilon} \cdot \text{poly}(n)$

Thank you!

Universal symmetric attr. algorithms

Jurdziński
Morvan,
↑ Thejaswini



{•, •, •} - colourful-4-universal

$$O(n^2 \cdot k!^{1+o(1)})$$

Majumdar
Saġlam, Thejaswini

20

22

22

23



Daviaud
Jurdziński
Thejaswini


Reg. #
= str #

Thejaswini,
Ohlmann
Jurdzinski

Reducing runtime
of symmetric attractor based
algs

$$O(n^2 k!^{1+o(1)})$$

Almost-sure
winning - stochastic
Rabin games



(4,2,2)-Strahler Universal Tree

PolySAT

A Word-level Solver for Large Bitvectors

Jakob Rath

TU Wien

Joint work with Clemens Eisenhofer, Daniela Kaufmann,
Nikolaj Bjørner, Laura Kovács

PolySAT: a Word-level Solver for Large Bitvectors

Bitvectors?

1. Sequence of bits, e.g., `01011`
2. Fixed-width machine integers, e.g., `uint32_t`, `int64_t`
3. Modular arithmetic: $\mathbb{Z}/2^k\mathbb{Z}$

PolySAT: a Word-level Solver for Large Bitvectors

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Examples:

- ▶ $2x^2y + z = 3$
- ▶ $x + 3 \leq x + y$
- ▶ $\neg\Omega^*(x, y), \quad z = x \& y, \quad x[3:0] = 0, \quad \dots$
- ▶ Negation, disjunction of constraints

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- ▶ Negation, disjunction of constraints

Existing approaches: bit-blasting, translation to integers

Example

$$x + 3 \leq x + y \pmod{2^3}$$

- ▶ For $x = 0$: $3 \leq y \iff y \in \{3, 4, 5, 6, 7\}$
- ▶ For $x = 2$: $5 \leq 2 + y \iff y \in \{3, 4, 5\}$

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► For $x = 2$: $5 \leq 2 + y \iff y \in \{3, 4, 5\}$

► $x + 3 \leq -y + 2 \pmod{2^3}$

$$p \leq q$$

$$p \leq p - q - 1$$

$$q - p \leq q$$

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$$-q - 1 \leq p - q - 1$$

PolySAT is a theory solver for bitvector arithmetic:

- ▶ Search for a model of the input formula
- ▶ Incrementally **assign bitvector variables** (e.g., $x := 2$)
- ▶ Propagate **feasible sets**, e.g.:

$$x := 2 \wedge x + 3 \leq x + y \implies y \in \{3, 4, 5\} \pmod{2^3}$$

- ▶ Add **lemmas** on demand, e.g.:

$$px < qx \wedge \neg \Omega^*(p, x) \implies p < q$$

From loops, to program synthesis, and beyond!

Daneshvar Amrollahi

TU Wien

Joint work with P. Hozzová, L. Kovács, M. Moosbrugger, etc.

October 9, 2023

Loops

A major challenge in formal verification

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A major challenge in formal verification

- ▶ Loop invariants
 - ▶ Capture loop behavior as a logical formula: $x + 3y^2 = 2z^3$
 - ▶ Used in program verification
 - ▶ Automated invariant generation techniques based on symbolic computation, algebraic recurrence equations, static analysis, etc.

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A major challenge in formal verification

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 - ▶ Capture loop behavior as a logical formula: $x + 3y^2 = 2z^3$
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 - ▶ Automated invariant generation techniques based on symbolic computation, algebraic recurrence equations, static analysis, etc.
- ▶ Loop synthesis
 - ▶ Synthesizing a program (loop) given a specification
 - ▶ Program correctness by construction
 - ▶ Specification: a polynomial loop invariant
 - ▶ Applications in compiler optimization: single path loops, linear updates

Program Synthesis

- ▶ A framework based on saturation-based theorem proving.
- ▶ Specification: $\forall \bar{x}. \exists y. F[\bar{x}, y]$
- ▶ Framework output:
 - ▶ A program with `if-then-else` statements
 - ▶ A proof that the spec. holds (using Vampire)

Beyond

Something around SMT with Clark Barrett at Stanford

AUTOSARD

Matthias Hetzenberger

supervised by Florian Zuleger

AUTOSARD

Automated **S**ublinear **A**mortised **R**esource
Analysis of Data **S**tructures

Matthias Hetzenberger

supervised by Florian Zuleger

- Goal: develop automated reasoning techniques w.r.t. amortised cost analysis of (probabilistic) functional data structures

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- Current focus *Zip Trees* [Tarjan, Levy, and Timmel 2021]



Leutgeb, Lorenz, Georg Moser, and Florian Zuleger (2022).
“Automated Expected Amortised Cost Analysis of Probabilistic
Data Structures”. In: *Computer Aided Verification*. Springer
International Publishing, pp. 70–91. DOI:
[10.1007/978-3-031-13188-2_4](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13188-2_4). URL:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13188-2_4.



Tarjan, Robert E., Caleb Levy, and Stephen Timmel (Oct. 2021).
“Zip Trees”. In: *ACM Transactions on Algorithms* 17.4, pp. 1–12.
DOI: [10.1145/3476830](https://doi.org/10.1145/3476830). URL:
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3476830>.

IC3

Islam Hamada

TU Wien

for(sy)te

2023



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WIEN
Vienna University of Technology

Overview

- ▶ Prominent model checking algorithm.

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
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- ▶ builds multiple successive overapproximations of reachable states simultaneously.
- ▶ looks for a proof of correctness by finding an inductive invariant that is safe, otherwise gives a counter example.
- ▶ Building the invariant is guided by **CTIs**.

$$R_i \wedge T \wedge \neg P'$$



Aspects To Investigate

- ▶ The used heuristic for generalizing clauses

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- ▶ Avoiding duplicate clauses.
- ▶ Global clauses
- ▶ Generalizing the CTIs further

Incremental IC3

- ▶ Two related transition relations, T and T_c such that $T_c \subseteq T$.

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- ▶ Reusing clauses directly
- ▶ Reusing CTIs and lifting them further
- ▶ Reusing the invariant

Learn to be Dynamical


Mahyar Karimi

ISTA

October 9, 2023


All about Dynamical Systems

- ▶ Jumping particle:




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
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
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
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
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- ▶ Transitions: $x_{t+1} = f(x_t)$.

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- ▶ Transitions: $x_{t+1} = f(x_t)$.
- ▶ Can we reach T ?

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Can we have a function V that

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- ▶ **Guided search for V ?**

Neural Lyapunov Functions

Let's use a neural network to find V !

- ▶ Learning $V \iff$ Loss Function + Gradient Descent
- ▶ Loss should *capture* V .

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Catch! No guarantee for generalization.

Good news; we can use SMT solving.

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Catch! 2 generalization queries instead of 1.
- ▶ More can be learned: partitioning X , error bounds, ...



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WIEN

Separation Logic for Program Analysis

Florian Sextl
2023-10-09

Central Ideas

Goals

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- Verify memory safety even in unsafe programs (e.g. C/`unsafe` in Rust)

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- Based on strong but manageable separation logic

Central Ideas


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Approach

- Based on strong but manageable separation logic
- Symbolic execution with bi-abduction

Previously: Sound Bi-abduction-based Shape Analysis



Program Synthesis via {Saturation, SMT solving}

Petra Hozzová

supervised by Laura Kovács,
and working with Andrei Voronkov, Nikolaj Bjørner, Daneshvar Amrollahi, . . .

Synthesis in saturation

Synthesize a **program** computing y for any \bar{x} such that $F(\bar{x}, y)$ holds using a **saturation-based prover** proving $\forall \bar{x}. \exists y. F(\bar{x}, y)$ **using induction**.

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first-order formula,
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term, possibly using `if-then-else`,
recursively defined functions,
and only containing **computable** symbols

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using answer literals,
supporting derivation of clauses $C \vee \text{ans}(r)$ where C is computable,
expressing “if $\neg C$, then r is the program”

Synthesis with SMT-solving

Synthesize a **program** computing the **function** f such that $F(\bar{x}, f)$ holds
using **quantifier elimination games** for $\exists f. \forall \bar{x}. F(\bar{x}, f)$.*

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Using an interplay of two procedures, that in turns find interpretations of f and \bar{x} .
If the final interpretation satisfies the formula, we learn a case in the program.
Otherwise we either learn a lemma or conclude the synthesis.

Krishnendu Chatterjee, Thomas Henzinger, Stefanie Muroya Lei

Quantum Information Markov Decision Processes for Robust Quantum Programs Synthesis



Quantum Algorithms Workflow

QUANTUM STATE
IN A WELL
DEFINED STATE



APPLY QUANTUM
GATES AND
MEASUREMENTS



A PROBABILITY
DISTRIBUTION
OVER CLASSICAL
STATES

Challenges

- **Quantum Computers are very noisy**
- **The no-cloning theorem**
- **We cannot directly observe quantum states**
- **Quantum algorithms are hard to engineer**

Input


T →

λ →

H →

O_0 →

I →



Output

**Program for H
that reaches with
 $Pr(T) \geq \lambda$ from
 O_0**

T : set of target states

λ : threshold

H : hardware spec.

O_0 : distribution over states

I : set of instructions

Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDP)

A POMDP is a tuple $\langle S, A, \mathcal{O}, \Delta, \gamma_1 \rangle$ where:

- S is a set of states
- A is a set of actions
- \mathcal{O} is a set of observations
- $\Delta : S \times A \times S \rightarrow [0,1]$ is a probabilistic transition function
- $\gamma_1 : S \rightarrow \mathcal{O}$

Quantum Information Markov Decision Processes (QIMDP)


A QIMDP is a tuple $\langle M, I, C, \rightarrow_H, \gamma_2 \rangle$ where:

- M is a set of hybrid states
- I is a set of instructions
- C is a set of classical states
- $\rightarrow_H : M \times I \times M \rightarrow [0,1]$ is a probabilistic transition function
- $\gamma_2 : M \rightarrow C$

CALGSAT

Combining Computer Algebra with SAT Solving

Daniela Kaufmann



Computer ALGebra

Polynomial System $P \subseteq \mathbb{K}[X]$
 $\{x^2 + y = 0, -4y + xz = 0, yz + 3 = 0\}$



Computer Algebra System



System with all solutions
 $\{z^3 - 48 = 0, 16y + z^2 = 0, 4x + z = 0\}$

- Recent success in formal verification
- word-level and bit-level models
- general purpose solvers
- returns all solutions

SAT Solving

Propositional Logic Formula
 $(x \vee y) \wedge (\bar{x} \vee z) \wedge (x \vee \bar{z}) \wedge (\bar{y} \vee \bar{z})$



SAT Solver



Single assignments
 $\{x = \top, y = \perp, z = \top\}$

Model


Reasoning
Engine

Solution

- Over 50 years of research → “Killer application”
- bit-level models
- dedicated heuristics and solving engines
- single assignments

Circuit Verification

64-bit multipliers (384 instances)



Computer algebra + SAT
solves 384/384

Computer algebra
solves 254/384

SAT solves 0/384

Computer ALGebra

$$P \subseteq \mathbb{Z}[X], X \in \mathbb{B}$$

Pseudo-Boolean Integer Polynomials

- Hardware verification

Variables represent signals in circuits
Integer coefficients for word-level
specification

$$P \subseteq \mathbb{Z}/2^w\mathbb{Z}[X], X \in \mathbb{Z}/2^w\mathbb{Z}[X]$$
$$P \subseteq \mathbb{F}_q[X], X \in \mathbb{F}_q$$

Polynomials in finite domains

- Verification of cryptosystems

Variables and coefficients are used
to represent states of the system

Theory Reasoning in Saturation Theorem Proving

Johannes Schoisswohl

Theory Reasoning in Saturation Theorem Proving

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- Saturation Algorithms

Theory Reasoning in Saturation Theorem Proving

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$$x_0 < x_1 \wedge x_1 < x_2 \wedge x_2 < x_3 \rightarrow x_0 < x_3$$

Theory Reasoning in Saturation Theorem Proving

- Saturation Algorithms
 - Assume $\neg\phi$
 - Apply a set of rules exhaustively
 - Until contradiction found or no rules applicable
 - **Mainly for Uninterpreted Symbols**
- Theory Reasoning
 - Symbols have predefined meaning (e.g. $+$, $<$)
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 - **Problem: Very explosive!**

$$x_0 < x_1 \wedge x_1 < x_2 \rightarrow x_0 < x_2$$

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...

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Theory Reasoning in Saturation Theorem Proving

Background Theories \mathcal{T} + Quantifiers

Background Theories \mathcal{T} + Quantifiers

Theory Reasoning in Saturation Theorem Proving

Background Theories \mathcal{T} + Quantifiers

- Naive approach: Axioms

Theory Reasoning in Saturation Theorem Proving

Background Theories \mathcal{T} + Quantifiers

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 - Linear Real Arithmetic + Uninterpreted Functions
 - Beats State of the Art

Background Theories \mathcal{T} + Quantifiers

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- ALASCA (done)
 - Linear Real Arithmetic + Uninterpreted Functions
 - Beats State of the Art
- ALASCAI (in progress)
 - ALASCA + Floor Function
 - Allows for integer reasoning



Bidding Games taking *Charge*

...in *theory* and in *practice*


Kaushik Mallik

Henzinger Group


Bid-Tac-Toe



Bid-Tac-Toe



€ 71




€ 9

Bid-Tac-Toe

$$\frac{7}{8} + \varepsilon$$



€ 71




€ 9

$$\frac{1}{8} - \varepsilon$$


Bid-Tac-Toe

$$\frac{7}{8} + \varepsilon$$




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Bid-Tac-Toe


		

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
Bid-Tac-Toe

$$\frac{7}{8} + \varepsilon$$




~~€ 71~~
€ 61



~~€ 9~~
€ 19

$$\frac{1}{8} - \varepsilon$$



Bid-Tac-Toe

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


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Bid-Tac-Toe





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20
~~€71~~
€61

19
~~€9~~
€19

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
Bid-Tac-Toe

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
~~€71~~
~~€61~~
€41



~~€9~~
~~€19~~
€39

$$\frac{1}{8} - \epsilon$$

Bid-Tac-Toe



$$\frac{7}{8} + \epsilon$$

40

O

~~€ 71~~
~~€ 61~~
€ 41


39

X

~~€ 9~~
~~€ 19~~
€ 39

$$\frac{1}{8} - \epsilon$$

Bid-Tac-Toe



$$\frac{7}{8} + \epsilon$$

40


€71
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Bid-Tac-Toe



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
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Bid-Tac-Toe



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

39

~~€ 9~~
~~€ 19~~
€ 39

$$\frac{1}{8} - \epsilon$$

Does the *threshold* exist?



Bid-Tac-Toe



Does the *threshold* exist?

Verify if the threshold < 0.5 .

Bid-Tac-Toe



Does the *threshold* exist?

Verify if the threshold < 0.5 .

Characterize the winning strategies.

Two Ongoing Projects

Bidding games with *charging*

- State-dependent monetary incentives

Ex.: **X** earns 50 EUR when **O** captures 2 corners

- joint work with Guy Avni, Ehsan, and Tom

Two Ongoing Projects

Bidding games with *charging*

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Ex.:  earns 50 EUR when  captures 2 corners

	Reach	Safe	Büchi	Co-Büchi	Rabin	Streett
Threshold	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Verification*	coNP	NP	Π_2^P	Σ_2^P	NP-hard	coNP-hard
Winning strategies	✓	✓	✓	✓		

*for Richman bidding

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Two Ongoing Projects

Bidding games with *charging*

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
Ex.:  earns 50 EUR when  captures 2 corners

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Auction-based scheduling



- joint work with Guy Avni and Suman Sadhukhan

Two Ongoing Projects

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
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


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
Automated Analysis of Probabilistic Loops


Marcel Moosbrugger

ISTA – October 2023




```
stop := 0
y := 1
x := 0
while stop == 0:
    stop := flip_coin()
    y := 2y
    x := x + 1
```






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```



Probabilistic programs/loops as universal models.


```
stop := 0
y := 1
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while stop == 0:
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```



MY PHD PROJECT

Develop **PL & verification** techniques to analyze **probabilistic loops**

Termination Analysis

[ESOP 2021, FM 2021, FMSD 2022]

Invariant Synthesis

[OOPSLA 2022, SAS 2022, FMSD 2023]

Sensitivity Analysis


[iFM 2023]

Predicting movement of robots under uncertainty

[QEST 2022, TOMACS 2023]

Focus on: automation, exact results
(no sampling)

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MY PHD PROJECT

Develop **PL & verification** techniques
to analyze **probabilistic loops**



Polar Tool:

Probabilistic Loop Analyzer

<https://github.com/probing-lab/polar>

Ongoing Work

Theoretical foundations: Hardness bounds
Stability of control systems with uncertainty


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Solving Stochastic Games Reliably


Maximilian Weininger

ISTA Seminar
09.10.2023


Software has bugs



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


has bugs

https://bilder.t-online.de/b/76/51/02/04/id_76510204/tid_da/ein-herzschriftmacher-soll-leben-retten-hacker-koennten-ihn-als-mordwerkzeug-nutzen-.jpg

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CREDIT SCORE



https://bilder.t-online.de/b/76/51/02/04/id_76510204/tid_da/ein-herzschriftmacher-soll-leben-retten-hacker-koennten-ihn-als-mordwerkzeug-nutzen-.jpg


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
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FORMAL VERIFICATION


Formal verification




Formal verification **with special effects**




Formal verification **with special effects**



Formal verification **with special effects**



Formal verification **with special effects**



Ground orderedness in superposition

Márton Hajdu

October 4, 2023

The superposition calculus

- ▶ The superposition calculus is the **state-of-the-art approach** for first-order equational logic

The superposition calculus

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$$\frac{s[u] \bowtie t \vee C \quad l \simeq r \vee D}{(s[r] \bowtie t \vee C \vee D)\theta}$$

where $\theta = mgu(u, l)$, u not a variable, $r\theta \not\approx l\theta$, $t\theta \not\approx s[u]\theta$ and $C\theta \not\approx s[u] \bowtie t\theta$

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- ▶ **Strong restrictions** on the inferences and **redundancy elimination** make it efficient
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Example

Given $f > a > b > c$

$$\frac{P(f(f(a, x), c)) \quad f(f(y, b), z) \simeq f(y, f(b, z))}{P(f(a, f(b, c)))} \theta = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} x \mapsto b, \\ y \mapsto a, \\ z \mapsto c \end{array} \right\}$$

The orderedness redundancy criteria

Given $f > a > b > c$ and clause $f(x, y) \simeq f(y, x)$, this inference is redundant:

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Orderedness is a generalization of *compositeness* from completion-based theorem proving.

Ground orderedness

Given clauses $\{f(x, y) \simeq f(y, x), f(x, x) \simeq x\}$, consider the inference:

$$\frac{Q(f(f(x, y), z), f(y, x)) \quad f(f(x, y), z) \simeq f(x, f(y, z))}{Q(f(x, f(y, z)), f(y, x))}$$

Ground orderedness

Given clauses $\{f(x, y) \simeq f(y, x), f(x, x) \simeq x\}$, consider the inference:

$$f(x, y) \simeq f(y, x)$$

assuming $x > y$ or $x < y$

reduces

smaller than

$$Q(f(f(x, y), z), f(y, x))$$

$$f(f(x, y), z) \simeq f(x, f(y, z))$$


$$Q(f(f(x, y), z), f(y, x))$$

$$f(f(x, y), z) \simeq f(x, f(y, z))$$

$$Q(f(x, f(y, z)), f(y, x))$$


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Ground orderedness


Given clauses $\{f(x, y) \simeq f(y, x), f(x, x) \simeq x\}$, consider the inference:



The inference is **redundant** w.r.t. **ground orderedness**!

Ground orderedness

Given clauses $\{f(x, y) \simeq f(y, x), f(x, x) \simeq x\}$, consider the inference:



The inference is **redundant** w.r.t. **ground orderedness**!

Both orderedness and ground orderedness are currently being implemented in **Vampire**



Shorter, more usable proofs in SAT and beyond

Adrián Rebola-Pardo

Vienna University of Technology
Johannes Kepler University

IST Austria
October 9th, 2023

Wait, wasn't that a solved problem?

DRAT proofs have *weird* semantics

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can derive clauses not implied by the premises

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mutation
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clearer semantics

easier to generate

shorter proofs

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can we unify QBF proof systems?
extension to
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semantics

can we unify QBF proof systems?

**extension to
QBF solving**

can we uniformly sample?

**extension to
model counting**

Recognizing an Owl-Bear in the Forest

Regular Languages of Tree-Width Bounded Graphs

Mark Chimes

October 4, 2023

Finite alphabet **A** of terminal symbols e.g. $\{a, b, c, \dots, z\}$


Regular languages

- Regular Expression
- Automaton
- Generated by Regular Grammar
- **Definable:**
Monadic Second-Order Logic
- **Recognizable:**
Inverse image under homomorphism into a finite monoid

Words

Words form a monoid $\langle \Sigma^*, \epsilon, \cdot \rangle$

$$owl \cdot bear = owlbear$$



Finite alphabet **A** of terminal symbols e.g. $\{a, b, c, \dots, z\}$

Words

Words form a monoid $\langle \Sigma^*, \epsilon, \cdot \rangle$


Graphs - Generalize Words

Label edges with symbols in \mathbb{A}

- Need to know *how* to combine two graphs
- Vertices are not ordered, but finitely many are numbered
- Graph operations combine graphs along numbers

Graphs form a **Multi-Sorted Magma** - generalizes Monoid.


$owl \cdot bear = owlbear$



↑





=



Families of graphs (Languages) with **bounded tree-width**

Regular languages of Graphs

- Regular Expression
- Automaton
- Generated by Regular Grammar
- **Definable:**
Monadic Second-Order Logic **with counting**
- **Recognizable:**
Inverse image under homomorphism into a **locally-finite multi-sorted Magma**



Stability in Matrix Games



K. Chatterjee¹



R. Saona¹



M. Orlu-Barton²

¹IST Austria

²CEREMADE, CNRS, Université Paris Dauphine, PSL Research Institute

Main idea

Classical settings. Matrix games and Linear Programming (LP).

Classical question. Stability:

How do our objects of interest change upon perturbations?

Observables. Solutions and value of the problems.

How do solutions and value change
upon perturbations?

Matrix Games

$$i \begin{pmatrix} & j \\ & m_{i,j} \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\text{val}M := \max_{p \in \Delta[m]} \min_{q \in \Delta[n]} p^t M q.$$

$$M(\varepsilon) = M_0 + M_1 \varepsilon.$$

Derivative of the value function [Mills56]

Define

$$D\text{val}M(0^+) := \lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0^+} \frac{\text{val}M(\varepsilon) - \text{val}M(0)}{\varepsilon}.$$

Results.

- 1 Characterization of $D\text{val}M(0^+)$.
- 2 (Poly-time) algorithm for computing it.

Theorem ([Mills56])

Given $M(\varepsilon) = M_0 + M_1\varepsilon$,

$$D\text{val}M(0^+) = \text{val}_{P(M_0) \times Q(M_0)} M_1.$$

Our framework

Polynomial matrix games. Matrix games where payoff entries are given by polynomials.

$$M(\varepsilon) = M_0 + M_1\varepsilon + \dots + M_K\varepsilon^K .$$

Definition (Value-positivity problem)

$\exists \varepsilon_0 > 0$ such that $\forall \varepsilon \in [0, \varepsilon_0]$ $\text{val}M(\varepsilon) \geq \text{val}M(0)$.

Definition (Uniform value-positivity problem)

$\exists p_0 \in \Delta[m]$ $\exists \varepsilon_0 > 0$ $\forall \varepsilon \in [0, \varepsilon_0]$ $\text{val}(M(\varepsilon); p_0) \geq \text{val}M(0)$.

Definition (Functional form problem)

Return the maps $\text{val}M(\cdot)$ and $p^*(\cdot)$, for $\varepsilon \in [0, \varepsilon_0]$.

Polynomial matrix game

Consider $\varepsilon > 0$.

$$M(\varepsilon) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & -1 \\ -1 & 1 \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} 1 & -3 \\ 0 & 2 \end{pmatrix} \varepsilon.$$

The optimal strategy is given by, for $\varepsilon < 1/2$,

$$p_\varepsilon^* = \left(\frac{1 + \varepsilon}{2 + 3\varepsilon}, \frac{1 + 2\varepsilon}{2 + 3\varepsilon} \right)^t.$$

Therefore,

$$\text{val}M(\varepsilon) = \frac{\varepsilon^2}{2 + 3\varepsilon}.$$

Polynomial matrix game, negative direction

Consider $\varepsilon > 0$.

$$M(\varepsilon) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & -1 \\ -1 & 1 \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} -1 & 3 \\ 0 & -2 \end{pmatrix} \varepsilon.$$

The optimal strategy is given by, for $\varepsilon < 2/3$,

$$p_\varepsilon^* = \left(\frac{1 - \varepsilon}{2 - 3\varepsilon}, \frac{1 - 2\varepsilon}{2 - 3\varepsilon} \right)^t.$$

Therefore,

$$\text{val}M(\varepsilon) = \frac{\varepsilon^2}{2 - 3\varepsilon}.$$

Statistical Monitoring of Stochastic Systems

(with focus on Algorithmic Fairness)

$$f : \Sigma^* \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$$

some function

$$\vec{X} ::= (X_t)_{t>0}$$

a stochastic process

$$t \in \mathbb{N}^+$$

at any point in time

$$\vec{x}_t := x_1, \dots, x_t$$

observe a realisation

$$I \subseteq [1; t]$$


$$\mathbb{E}(f(\vec{X}_t) \mid \vec{x}_I)$$


want to compute

Example.

Too many coins.

X_3 X_2 X_1






Is this process “fair”

Many different definitions.

$$P(H) - P(T)$$

How fair is it...

...at time t ?



Property:

$$\mathbb{E}(X_3)$$


$$x_3 = T$$

$$x_2 = H$$

$$x_1 = H$$

How fair is it...

...at this very moment?



Property:

$$\mathbb{E}(X_3 | x_1, x_2)$$

The model could be...

... too big.

... wrong.

... hidden.

... mistrusted.

But maybe

you have some...

$$P \in \mathcal{P}$$


assumptions


$$\hat{E}_f(\vec{x}_t)$$

you estimate


The Big Picture.

What is the general setting?





$\mathbb{E}(f(\vec{X}) \mid \vec{x}_I) \in \mathcal{A}(\vec{x}_t)$ with probability $1 - \delta$



Previous Work.

A quick overview.

System

MCS

Property

$\mathbb{P}(r \mid q)$

System

some POMCs

Property

$$\mathbb{E}(f(X_{t:t+n}))$$

System | $\mathbb{E}(X_{t+1} \mid \vec{x}_t) = \mathbb{E}(X_t \mid \vec{x}_{t-1}) + \Delta(x_t)$

Property | $\mathbb{E}(f(X_t) \mid \vec{x}_{t-1})$

Summary.

What are we doing?

Interested in monitoring “distributional” properties, e.g. conditional expectation, of stochastic processes.

Leverage tools from non-asymptotic statistics to provide valid guarantees for each time step.

We focused on monitoring Algorithmic Fairness, but those techniques have wide applicability.

Use statistical monitoring to breach the gap between the model and reality.

ON THE DECIDABILITY OF ALGEBRAIC LOOP ANALYSIS

Anton Varonka

2nd year PhD student supervised by Laura Kovács



Informatics



*Formal Methods
in Systems Engineering*

In my PhD project, I explore the **decidability** landscape of **verification**-motivated problems, in particular, those that underlie automated reasoning about **program loops**.


- code fragment \longleftrightarrow behaviours
- model loops as dynamical systems, i.e., algebraic program analysis
- linear vs not

WHAT IS IT ALL ABOUT


A simple loop acting on a vector x of integer variables.

Program correctness:


- Termination on all branches
- Finding good invariants



LOOPS AND INVARIANTS




LOOPS AND INVARIANTS



```
(x, y) := (0, 0)
while y < N do
  x := x + 2y + 1
  y := y + 1
```

$$y = x^2$$

LOOPS AND INVARIANTS




```
(x, y) := (0, 0)
while y < N do
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  y := y + 1
```

(0, 0)

$y = x^2$
holds before

LOOPS AND INVARIANTS




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(0, 0) (1, 1) (2, 4) ...

$y = x^2$
holds before and after
each iteration

LOOPS AND INVARIANTS




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```

(0, 0) (1, 1) (2, 4) ...

$y = x^2$
holds before and **after**
each iteration

For a loop \mathcal{L} , **generate** all **polynomial invariants** $p = 0$ which \mathcal{L} preserves.

LOOPS AND INVARIANTS



```
(x, y) := (0, 0)
while y < N do
  x := x + 2y + 1
  y := y + 1
```

(0, 0) (1, 1) (2, 4) ...

$y = x^2$
holds before and **after**
each iteration

For a polynomial invariant $p = 0$, **synthesise** a partially correct **linear loop**.

VAMOS!

Presenter: *Marek Chalupa*

October 9, 2023

Previously

Previously...

A long time ago
in a galaxy far, far away

≈ 2 years
Brno (aka. Wien-Nord)

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...I got PhD from Masaryk University.

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
Static verification of software

- forward and backward symbolic execution
- k-induction, invariant generation, ...
- dependency analysis, program slicing

At ISTA


Runtime Verification

Observing a system as it is running and formally verifying properties of the run.




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Runtime Verification

Observing a system as it is running and formally verifying properties of the run.



Project #1: VAMOS

VAMOS is a runtime monitoring framework

- written in C, C++, Python, and Rust

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- written in C, C++, Python, and Rust

Team:

- M., Tom Henzinger, Stefanie M. Lei, Fabian Muehlboeck

Goals of VAMOS are:

- provide basic building blocks for implementations of monitors
 - tracing events and transmitting them to monitors,
 - events and streams pre-processing and transformations

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- support connecting heterogeneous event sources to different monitors (with best-effort and black-box monitoring in mind)

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- provide basic building blocks for implementations of monitors
 - tracing events and transmitting them to monitors,
 - events and streams pre-processing and transformations
- support connecting heterogeneous event sources to different monitors (with best-effort and black-box monitoring in mind)
- focus on scenarios with multiple parallel streams of events

Project #2:
Monitoring hyperproperties

Properties that relate multiple execution traces.

Properties that relate multiple execution traces.

For each trace that contains event A , there exists a different trace with A on the same position.

Monitoring hyperproperties

Setup:

- new traces are announced anytime on runtime
- new events come incrementally to traces

Monitoring hyperproperties

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We work with:

- Multi-trace prefix transducers
- Hypernode automata and logic

Monitoring hyperproperties

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- Multi-trace prefix transducers
- Hypernode automata and logic

Team:

- M., Ana Costa, Tom Henzinger, Oldouz Neysari

The presentation raises more questions than answers?

The presentation raises more questions than answers?

Good – come and talk to me :)

CirVer

Verifying algebraic circuits

Thomas Hader, Daniela Kaufmann

October, 9 2023

zk-SNARKs

zk-Proof: Prover **P** ensures verifier **V** that a valid computation of **code** is known.

zero-knowledge proof code

written in DSL

```
component unit[k - 1];  
for (var i = 1; i < k; i++){  
    unit[i - 1].a <== a[i] * b[i];
```

compiler
optimizer

Algebraic circuit

(e.g. R1CS, PLONKish)

set of polynomial constraints in \mathbb{F}_p

$$x_1 = x_{12}x_8 - 2x_5x_8 + x_3$$


$$x_7 = x_1x_5$$

generated to code for

prover **P** and verifier **V**

Verifying algebraic circuits

Verification target: **Circuit** must not be under-constraint (otherwise incorrect execution traces are accepted).



[1] Hader, Kaufmann, Kovács. *SMT Solving over Finite Field Arithmetic*. LPAR 2023